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Introduction: An Unusual Symmetry 
There is a most remarkable symmetry observable in the political 
development of Christian Democratic movements in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries with that of Hindu nationalist political move-
ment in India. The first characteristic shared by both movements is in 
the party and organizational formation stages – both the Christian 
Democracy movement and the Hindu nationalist political movement 
were shaped and driven by varying degrees of coordination and coali-
tion-building between religious authorities, conservative political 
parties, and mass organizations. In both instances, the political coali-
tion of conservatives and religious institutions was subsumed in im-
portance by mass organizations that redefined and drove the growth 
and rise to power of political parties explicitly embodying the princi-
ples of Christian Democracy and Hindu nationalism. This symmetry 
was further confirmed by the second observable characteristic, which 
is the creation of a structurally identical political economy by both 
movements. In European nations governed by Christian Democratic 
political parties in the late 19th century and with the arrival of the 
present Hindu nationalist government in India in the 21st century, a 
corporate welfare state model was conceived and implemented that 
preserved the traditional socioeconomic stratification and emphasized 
social values traditional to Roman Catholicism and Hinduism, while 
contrasting the universalism and egalitarianism advocated by social 
democratic models. 
To be sure, the proposed comparison is not perfect. While Chris-
tian Democracy has largely secularized and democratized, Hindu na-
tionalism remains deeply influenced by religious extremism and has 
an authoritarian tendency. However, the observed symmetries of for-
mation and outcomes become more interesting when one considers 
how dissimilar India is from the European countries such as Germany 
and Austria, where Christian Democracy took hold. The theological 
principles and leadership structures of Hinduism and Roman Cathol-
icism are also distinct. As a result, developing a theoretical explana-
tion and mechanism that can explain the symmetrical rise of 
Christian Democracy and Hindu nationalism may prove significant 
as it may shed light on some of the common mechanisms driving po-
litical systems in an increasingly globalized world. A comparative 
study of European and Indian political systems may also assist in clar-
ifying some longstanding disputes between the primacy of rational ac-
tion and ideological essentialism in explaining political development.   
Using a comparative historical approach, this paper traces the 
structural and ideational forces that shaped the rise of Christian De-
mocracy and Hindu nationalism, and studies their impact on party 
formation, identity formation, and the construction and implementa-
tion of their respective sociopolitical agendas. This paper qualitatively 
analyzes how ideational systems affect the development of structural 
cleavages and how both ideational and structural forces shape political 
decision-making and policy outcomes.    
Theory - Ideational Replication of Structures and Cleavages 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identify the phenomenon of the “Na-
tional Revolution,” which produces two significant cleavages; the 
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first being “the conflict between the central nation-building culture 
and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or re-
ligiously distinct subject populations in the provinces and the pe-
ripheries,” and the second being “the conflict between the 
centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing nation-state and the his-
torically established corporate privileges” of religious institutions.1. 
It is the second cleavage that presents an essential clue to the solu-
tion of our problem.  
This paper contends that the ideational systems produced by 
structural cleavages may in turn create similar structural cleavages 
when those ideational systems are exported and implemented in 
states experiencing formative events such as independence, uni-
fication, and democratization. These transplanted ideational sys-
tems and structural cleavages continue to exercise strong 
influences on party formation and the decision-making of political 
actors. As Lipset and Rokkan note, the assertion of control by the 
nation-state over social policy such as education reflected “a sys-
tematic effort to create direct links of influence and control be-
tween the nation-state and the individual citizen.”2. This emerged 
as a major cleavage countries with religious diversity as such pol-
icy “came into direct conflict with the established rights” of the 
dominant religious orders, which saw themselves as being respon-
sible for the nurturing and salvation of society.3. The religious re-
sponse mobilized into “broad mass movements after the 
introduction of manhood suffrage and were able to claim the loy-
alties of remarkably high proportions.”4. The adaptation of liberal-
ism, which prioritized nation-state building at the expense of the 
corporate rights of religious systems, may trigger the state-religion 
cleavage in countries experiencing formative events and instigate 
1.  Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Align-
ments.” In Mair, Peter, ed., The West European Party System. (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 
1990), p. 101.
2.  Ibid., p. 102-103.
3.  Lipset and Rokkan, p. 102-103.
4.  Ibid. 
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the creation of religious democratic politics as a response to its 
own liberal-secular democratic policies and politics. 
In Germany, the second cleavage emerged during the Kultur-
kampf (Cultural Struggle) era (1872 – 1878), when the Bismarck 
regime sought to wrest control of education from the Roman Cath-
olic Church. The Catholic counter-mobilization that emerged in re-
sponse went on to become the Christian Democratic political 
movement. Competition with social democracy and liberalism 
further prompted the Christian Democratic movement to develop 
its own political economy and welfare-state model that preserved 
traditional social hierarchies and emphasized the centrality of the 
traditional family to society. In India, the second cleavage was 
created by the establishment of India as a constitutionally secular 
and liberal democratic state in 1950, followed by the liberalization 
of Hindu civil law and the establishment of affirmative action re-
servation policies for backward castes by the Nehru government, 
which challenged traditional Hindu conceptions of family, caste 
and society and modernized personal law. In response, the move-
ment identified as “Hindu nationalist” began its transition to what 
this research paper proposes to term the “Hindu Democracy” 
movement, pursuing mass mobilization, undergoing democratiza-
tion, and developing its own welfare-state model that reinforced 
traditional hierarchies of caste and class. The essential difference 
that this research paper does observe between the Christian Demo-
cratic movement and the Hindu nationalist movement is while the 
Christian Democratic movement began to undergo secularization 
after the end of the Kulturkampf, Hindu nationalism has not yet un-
dergone the process of secularization, as its arrival to political 
power is relatively recent and it has not completed the implementa-
tion of such policies that negate the perceived “anti-Hindu” impact 
of liberal and social democratic policies implemented in India in 
the past. Furthermore, Hindu nationalism remains strongly associ-
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ated with authoritarianism, which is not the case with Christian 
Democracy.  
In both Germany and India, the cleavages were not the direct 
result of structural events such as the revolution experienced by 
France but were created by the implementation of the ideologies 
that emerged out of the French Revolution. In a newly-unified Ger-
many, the liberal policies implemented by the government of 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck were aimed at reining in the power 
of the Roman Catholic Church, primarily to foster a national cul-
ture and overcome the problem of “dual loyalty” that Bismarck 
feared would divide Germans. In India, the authors of the Constitu-
tion understood that the survival of political freedom and democ-
racy in India was dependent upon the achievement of social and 
economic freedom, which the Nehru government attempted to 
achieve through liberalism and social democracy.5. The implemen-
tation of liberalism in Germany and India produced the symmet-
rical response in the elites of their predominant religions, which 
saw no alternative but to develop and promote a competing politi-
cal and socioeconomic model that defended religious rights and 
sought to preserve society along religious and traditional lines. 
This research paper asserts that ideologies can be both the result of 
sociopolitical cleavages as well as the creators of cleavages in 
structurally dissimilar societies.  
The political ideologies developed in the religious response are 
deeply rooted and driven by pre-existing theological and social 
doctrines that represented the Catholic and Hindu religious world-
view and social order. In both the cases of Germany and India, the 
Roman Catholic and Hindu religions enjoyed extensive control of 
societal institutions until the formation of the unified nation-state. 
5.  Anand Kumar, “The Welfare State System in India,” in Vivekanandan, 
B. and Kurian, Nimmi, eds., Welfare States and the Future. (New York, 
N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 338-339.
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In colonial India, the British Raj did implement some reforms such 
as banning the practice of sati (widow-burning), but it largely left 
Hindu personal law and other customs untouched and regulated by 
local Hindu clergy and orthodox caste leaders. The arrival of the 
unified nation-state, of liberal constitutionalism and of democra-
tization challenges the religious order by separating the state from 
the dominant religion, by emphasizing the individual against the 
social and religious organism and materialism against spiritualism. 
However, democratization creates an ideational space for the reli-
gious response and prompts religion to inspire a religion-centric 
political ideology and identity. In the case of Christian Democracy, 
its political solutions and identity were shaped by Catholic social 
thought, while with Hindu nationalism, the traditional caste-based 
structuring of society serves as the ideational foundation. As a re-
sult, while these ideologies are modified and nuanced according to 
the specific circumstances and issues of host societies, their super-
structure and path-dependence mechanisms remain identical.  
While the cleavage persists, this religious-ideational model 
limits the possible pathways for actors to make rational choices 
that attempt to achieve electoral successes by ideational compro-
mise. Indeed, electoral success is unlikely if actors attempt to vio-
late or transcend the ideology. However, the religion-ideology 
evolves when the political and economic systems of the nation-
state undergo structural modifications and transitions. It is only 
when the crisis of the cleavage is overcome or neutralized that the 
ideational movement can be substantially transformed beyond its 
religious foundations, as has been witnessed with the seculariza-
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Evaluation of Literature and Methodological Approaches 
A potential investigation for the observed symmetrical devel-
opment lies in the purely historical legacy of colonialism, which 
facilitated the transposition of European political ideas and institu-
tions into India. For almost two hundred years, the British Raj es-
tablished Western-style educational institutions, legal and 
administrative institutions and initiated economic industrialization. 
The British actively cultivated a new class of Indian professionals 
educated in Western institutions in order to aid the British in the 
administration of India and to facilitate the ‘gradual’ transition to 
self-governance. At this point, the politics of European colonial 
powers directly affected their Asian and African colonies. Thus, it 
would certainly not be unusual that European political ideologies 
and political institutions would directly and deeply impact the 
emerging Indian intelligentsia and affect the development of both 
the left-wing and the right-wing of Indian politics. Indeed, there 
was a great deal of Indian interaction not only with British politics 
but with Italian and German political organizations and ideologies. 
Early leaders of the nascent Hindu nationalist movement modeled 
their paramilitary organizations on the Italian fascist Brown Shirts 
and openly admired the racialist policies of German National So-
cialism. However, there are serious problems in considering this 
approach. The symmetries are between Hindu nationalism and 
Christian Democracy, not Italian fascism or German National So-
cialism, and they are symmetries of formation and outcomes, 
which cannot be accounted for by some accounts of mutual admi-
ration. A historical analysis of British colonialism in India does not 
yield any path-dependence mechanism to explain the symmetries 
of formation and outcomes.  
The second potential approach lies in the rational choice and 
actor theory, which may facilitate the argument that both the Chris-
tian Democratic and Hindu nationalist political movements were 
shaped by the strategies adopted by rational actors seeking to 
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maximize electoral success and fulfill their objectives. Stathis Ka-
lyvas argues that the Christian Democratic political movement was 
unplanned and unintended result of choices made by the Roman 
Catholic Church such as entering into political coalitions with con-
servative parties and promoting the creation of lay Catholic organi-
zations that soon asserted independence from Church control. 
Kalyvas argues that the Catholic political identity was created by 
the mobilization of lay Catholics and was different from the Catho-
lic religious or social identity. In the case of the Hindu nationalist 
movement in India, the rational actor theory is developed in the 
work of political scientist Tariq Thachil and historian Christophe 
Jaffrelot, both of whom argue that the Hindu nationalist movement 
expanded its organizational tent and designed its socioeconomic 
agenda based on strategies seeking to maximize electoral success 
without entirely sacrificing core ideology. However, while the ra-
tional choice and actor theory does not extend to explaining the 
similarities in party formation and identity formation that are part 
of the observable symmetry between Christian Democracy and 
Hindu nationalism.    
Structural Cleavage and Party Formation  
Our story begins at the point of the creation of the nation-state-
church structural cleavage. On January 18th, 1871, Germany 
emerged as a unified nation-state when the princes of German 
states gathered in Versailles to proclaim William I, King of Prussia 
as the first German Emperor. German statesman Otto von Bis-
marck, the architect of Germany’s unification and its victory over 
France, became its first Chancellor. On August 15th, 1947 India be-
came a self-governing dominion within the British Empire, and Ja-
waharlal Nehru, the leader of the Indian National Congress, 
became its first Prime Minister. Upon the promulgation of the Con-
stitution of India by its Constituent Assembly, India became an in-
dependent republic on January 26th, 1950.  
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As part of his efforts to build and assert a unified Germany na-
tional identity and loyalty, Bismarck adopted a number of liberal 
policies, collectively remembered as the Kulturkampf, to diminish 
the role and influence of transnational Roman Catholic Church in 
German life, the most important of which was establishing central-
ized state control of educational institutions. Under the new nation-
state institutions, the Catholic Church had been “increasingly 
deprived of its traditional privileged access to governments.”6. As a 
result, the church was compelled to develop new strategies and re-
visit its aversion to democratic politics. Although it officially re-
mained out of politics, the Church formed coalitions with 
conservative parties charged with protecting its interests and spon-
sored the creation of mass organizations to mobilize and organize 
Catholics both socially and politically.7.  
From 1947 to the mid-1950s in India, the Nehru government 
implemented extensive liberal reforms that challenge the founda-
tions of Hindu religious and social traditions. The first measure 
was the Hindu Code Bill, which created a liberalized civil code to 
replace the traditional body of Hindu personal law, which although 
had been amended a few times before, it had largely been left un-
touched by the British Raj.8. When presented to the Constituent As-
sembly on April 9th, 1948, the Hindu Code Bill received sharp 
criticism both from Hindu nationalists and Hindu traditionalist 
members of Nehru’s own Congress party. The Bill also provoked 
the entry into politics of religious leaders such as Swami Karpa-
triji, the leader of the Dandi order, who established a new political 
party in 1948 called the Akhil Bharatiya Ram Rajya Parishad (All 
India Council of the Kingdom of Ram), which organized demon-
strations that attracted as many as 15,000 people.9. As a result of in-
6.  Stathis Kalyvas, The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1996), p. 22.
7.  Ibid., p. 23. 
8.  Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics – 1925 to the 1990s: 
Strategies of Identity-Building, Implantation and Mobilisation (Kolkata: Penguin Books India, 1999). 
9.  Ibid. 
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tense opposition, Nehru temporarily withdrew the bill. 
The Indian Constitution of 1950 continued the erosion of tradi-
tional religious authority in India when it recognized not religious 
communities (who had been privileged during British colonial era), 
but individuals, who were guaranteed “freedom of conscience and 
the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion.”10. Ac-
cording to historian Christophe Jaffrelot, “this ideal concept of reli-
gion as a private matter implied a reduction in its sphere of 
influence through the impact of the state in its capacity as the agent 
of ‘modernization.’”11. It also made another significant structural 
change – it promulgated the universal adult suffrage, according the 
right to all Indian citizens aged 21 and above the right to vote, irre-
spective of sex, class or caste.  
The outbreak of the political battle over reforming Hindu soci-
ety induced orthodox Hindu and conservative leaders to enter dem-
ocratic politics. We already have noted the creation of the All-India 
Ram Rajya Parishad in 1948. At the same time, the long-standing 
Hindu conservative party, the Hindu Mahasabha (Great Assembly 
of Hindus) reached a crossroads. On February 6th, 1948, its  parlia-
mentary leader, S.P. Mookerjee sought to compel the party either to 
adapt to the new liberal, democratic system or withdraw from pol-
itics altogether – “to break with its political activities and limit it-
self to social, cultural and religious problems’, and, on the other, to 
‘abandon its communalist composition […] and open its doors to 
every citizen, regardless of religion, who was ready to accept its 
economic and political programme.”12. Mookerjee sought to purge 
the Mahasabha of its extremist and ultra-conservative elements, 
one of whom, the activist Nathuram Godse, had assassinated Ma-
hatma Gandhi only a week before, on January 30, 1948. Although 
initially resolving to restrict itself to socio-cultural wok, the old 
10.  Jaffrelot, p. 103. 
11.  Ibid. 
12.  Ibid., p. 91. 
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guard of the Mahasabha forced a recantation upon the outbreak of 
the Hindu Code Bill controversy, deciding “instead to renew its po-
litical activities, thus opting for the second alternative proposed by 
Mookerjee… without envisaging the admission of non-Hindus to 
the party.”13. Consequently, Mookerjee resigned from the Maha-
sabha on November 23rd, 1948.  
From 1948 until 1951, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (Na-
tional Volunteers Union), which considered itself as exclusively a 
socioreligious organization, debated whether to enter politics. 
Those R.S.S. leaders who advocated entry justified their position 
as ideological necessity. In an article published in the R.S.S pub-
lication, The Organiser, Balraj Madhok wrote developing a na-
tional character authentic to Indian culture now required a 
“political and economic” solution that the R.S.S. had traditionally 
avoided.14. Consequently, the R.S.S. decided to sponsor the crea-
tion of a new lay political party to represent and defend Hindu in-
terests. According to the new R.S.S. consensus, “India needed not 
only Bharatiya culture and religion but, in order for these to flour-
ish, a Bharatiya political and economic system as well. The true 
guardian of Bharatiya culture was the RSS. The opponents of the 
RSS were “anti-Dharmic” [Anti-religious]… The “only way to re-
store dharma” was “by putting the shoulder to the political 
wheel.”15. In 1951, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (Indian People’s 
Union) was formed, with the former Hindu Mahasabha leader, 
Shyama Prasad Mookerjee as its first president and a senior R.S.S. 
office-bearer, Deendayal Upadhyaya, as its general secretary.  
Following the first Indian general election of 1951-1952, 
Nehru reintroduced the Hindu Code legislation as separate, spe-
cialized bills; firstly, the Hindu Marriage Bill, which outlawed 
13.  Ibid. 
14.  Balraj Madhok, Organiser, III: 3, September 6th, 1949. 
15.  Craig Baxter, The Jana Sangh: A Biography of an Indian Political Party (Philadelphia, P.A.: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), p. 55.
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polygamy, liberalized divorce and legalized inter-caste marriages; 
the Hindu Succession Bill, which granted inheritance rights to 
widows and daughters equal to male family members.16. Although 
B.J.S. leader Shyama Prasad Mookerjee protested against what 
was considered “a threat to the stability and integrity of traditional 
forms of marriage and the family in Hindu society,” Nehru’s Con-
gress had a commanding majority and Nehru had ensured fewer 
traditionalists and more liberal and secularist members received 
election tickets, resulting in the construction of a new liberal-secu-
lar parliamentary party that approved both legislations.  
With the emergence of the state-church cleavage in both Ger-
many and India, the Catholic Church and orthodox Hindu leaders 
made rational decisions to enter democratic politics in the defense 
of religious interests. While the Lipset-Rokkan model predicts 
these events as an “automatic consequence of the conflict between 
the state and the church,” Kalyvas’s theory emphasizes that “con-
flicts and cleavages, even mass mobilization, need not translate 
into parties, and the organization of politics in terms of confession 
is not inevitable.”17. Instead, Kalyvas emphasizes “the process of 
party formation, ignores its micro-foundations, loses track of 
agency, and does not specify how and by whom parties are 
formed” as being important determinants of outcomes.18. However, 
the Kalyvas theory actively disregards the fact that at each stage, 
the precise choices presented to rational actors were determined by 
the modifications of political structures, which were in turn shaped 
by ideational forces. Both the emergent German and Indian States 
were constructed under a liberal framework that formulated their 
respective constitutions, institutions and democracies. Further, they 
used the democratic process to challenge the privileges of religious 
authorities. Pre-liberal, traditional power structures had been effec-
16.  Ibid. 
17.  Kalyvas, p. 14.
18.  Ibid.
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tively dissolved, which left the Church and Hindu religious leaders 
no rational choice but to participate in democratic processes in 
order to protect their interests. To decline to do so, would mean 
dissolution of all political relevance and importance as well as the 
end of their social and religious authority, for the liberal State 
would emerge undisputed as the arbiter of institutions and prac-
tices traditionally guided by religion.  
One of the implications of Kalyvas’s theory is that Christian 
Democratic mass organizations and their political parties made a 
rational choice to distance themselves from the Church and secu-
larize their agenda and appeal. However, Kimberley Cowell’s cri-
tique of Kalyvas points out that “only when the threat of 
Kulturkampf legislation disappeared (in part through the strength 
of Catholic resistance) could the party consider alternative formu-
lations and coalitions. Only when anti-Catholicism lost its political 
power could a secular party take shape.”19. Cowell points out that it 
is after the Zenstrumpartie (Center Party) began to achieve electo-
ral success at the expense of the Liberal Party, and through its suc-
cessful lobbying and pressure strategies that Bismarck was 
compelled to abandon the Kulturkampf measures.20. To attempt to 
deviate or alter ideational foundations before the cleavage crisis is 
resolved is invites a greater risk of failure. By the 1970s, the Jana 
Sangh party leadership sought to transform the party into one rep-
resenting “the common man,” adapting leftist economic ideas in 
challenging inflation, unemployment and corruption. As Walter 
Anderson and Shridhar Damle record, Jana Sangh leader Atal Bi-
hari Vajpayee wanted the party to represent “landless labour, small 
peasants, Harijans, workers, and employees in mills and offices, 
youths – particularly students, artisans, and small-scale entrepre-
neurs.”21. To do so, however, the Jana Sangh chose to ally with so-
19.  Kimberley Cowell, “The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe by Stathis N. Kalyvas (Review),” The 
Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 84, No. 1 (January 1998), pp. 141-142.
20.  Ibid. 
21.  Walter Anderson and Shridhar Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
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cialist political parties and supplied cadre to support the “Total 
Revolution” program of socialist Jayaprakash Narayan in late 
1974.22. Before the 1977 general election, the Jana Sangh extended 
its alliance to the degree of unifying organizationally with socialist 
parties to form the Janata Party, making what could be argued was 
a rational choice of unifying opposition parties in order to defeat 
the long-ruling Congress party. While the Janata Party did defeat 
the Congress, by 1979, Jana Sangh members of the Janata Party 
were forced to resign as the non-Jana Sangh leaders demanded that 
the Jana Sangh disavow its ideological patron, the R.S.S. Follow-
ing the collapse of the Janata Party in the 1980 general election, 
the leadership and cadre of the erstwhile Jana Sangh formed a new 
successor political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Ho-
wever, when the new party attempted again to dilute its ideological 
roots, professing “slogans such as ‘Gandhian socialism’ and ‘posi-
tive secularism’,” it immediately lost the ability to differentiate it-
self from the ruling Congress and opposition Socialists and won 
only 2 seats in the 1984 general election. After this disastrous 
debut, R.S.S. stalwart Lal Krishna Advani assumed the party pres-
idency and steered the BJP towards Hindu political causes such as 
the campaign to construct a temple dedicated to the Hindu god 
Ram in Ayodhya, on the premises of a medieval mosque.23. This 
shift, completed by 1989, paid better electoral dividends, with the 
BJP winning 88 seats in the 1989 election and 116 seats in the 
1991 election, emerging as the largest opposition party in Indian 
politics.  
In his work, Kalyvas uses the ‘thin’ definition of rationality, 
where “actors are seen as rational in the sense that they choose a 
course of action that is likely to produce the best outcome for 
them.”24. However, as demonstrated above, the choice that was 
Sangh ad Hindu Revivalism (Delhi: Penguin Random House India, 1987), p. 185-187.
22.  Ibid. 
23.  Christophe Jaffrelot, ed. Hindu Nationalism: A Reader (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2007).
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likeliest to produce the “best outcome” was consistently linked 
with the ideational movement. Neither the Christian Democratic 
nor Hindu nationalist political parties could successfully venture 
outside the ideational foundation before the ideational crisis that 
instigated their creation was resolved. In the German case, this was 
achieved largely with the repeal of the Kulturkampf measures by 
1878, while the Indian crisis may be arriving at a resolution during 
the second term of the Narendra Modi-led BJP government, which 
is passing ideationally-driven legislation undoing the liberal consti-
tutional framework established by the Nehru-led Congress govern-
ment. Although Kalyvas recognizes the “structural constraints that 
limit [the actor’s] possibilities of action,” his employed definition 
does not credit the ideational constraints that are also formidable 
forces shaping the choices available to actors.25.  
Ideational and Identity Formation  
The contest between the ideational forces of liberalism and reli-
gious-conservatism that produced the state-church cleavage also re-
sults in the creation of “Catholic” and “Hindu” political ideologies 
and “Catholic” and “Hindu” political identities. While these new 
ideologies and identities are articulated by political parties, they are 
founded in pre-existing theological and philosophical roots that have 
traditionally existed in the social and religious domain. 
 
Ideational Transition to Democracy  
In his work, Stathis Kalyvas credits the “formation of new 
identities and organizations” to the strategy of mass mobilization 
promoted by the Church, which unintentionally created, “for the 
first time, lay Catholics qua Catholics, creating a Catholic political 
(as opposed to a religious or social) identity... They redefined the 
24.  Kalyvas, p. 16.
25.  Ibid.
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meaning of Catholicism for politics, increased their distance from 
the church, and became autonomous political organizations.”26. Ho-
wever, Kalyvas’s model ignores the ideational arguments that had 
existed and persisted before in the course of history, of which the 
Christian Democratic and Hindu nationalist movements are new 
avatars. Both Roman Catholicism and Hinduism had extensive so-
cial doctrines that guided the lives of their respective communities. 
Until the arrival of democracy, which conferred political agency to 
the masses, there was no need to develop a political doctrine as 
there was no need to organize religious communities to contest for 
political power. With the advent, and firm establishment of democ-
racy, however, political power and control of the state is now only 
achievable by those political forces that can best organize and gal-
vanize popular support.  
The adaptation of Catholic and Hindu religious leadership to 
democracy was gradual and shaped by their ideational competition 
with liberalism. The Roman Catholic Church came out firmly 
against democracy in the 19th century, but this opposition can be 
understood by recognizing that democracy was not firmly estab-
lished in Europe until the end of the 19th century and thus remained 
contestable as an idea. Traditionalist Catholic conservative parties 
struggled continuously as democracy expanded. As Kees van Kers-
bergen observes in the case of Austria, “the [Christlich-Soziale 
Partei] CSP [of Austria] never fully accepted democratic princi-
ples, was strongly influenced by a Romantic longing for an ide-
alized past and aimed at the establishment of a corporatist social 
and political order that was to resemble a society of far-off days.”27. 
As a result, it never evolved beyond being “a class-based, clerico-
fascist” party.28. The ultra-conservative and orthodox Hindu Maha-
sabha shared a similar fate. Democracy was gradually introduced 
26.  Kalyvas, p. 25. 
27.  Kees van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State. 
Routledge, 1995, p. 34.
28.  Ibid.
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in colonial India in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with the 
British Raj first enabling voting for propertied and male Indians in 
local councils, then to a set proportion of seats in central and pro-
vincial councils. While Hindu conservatives formed the Hindu Ma-
hasabha initially as a pressure group to lobby both the British 
authorities and the Indian National Congress, they resisted the es-
tablishment of liberal democracy by periodically advocating pro-
posals based on religious and social ideas to deny the suffrage to 
Muslims and representation to lower caste Hindus. As suffrage was 
gradually expanded on liberal terms in both Germany and India, 
the impetus for political action and the ability to construct political 
ideology and identity inevitably passed from antidemocratic and 
hierarchical organizations that had functioned well in monarchical 
and imperial systems to grassroots lay organizations that had arisen 
along with democratization and had more democratic power on ac-
count of their mass membership in a democracy. The political for-
tunes of the Hindu Mahasabha and the clergy-driven All India Ram 
Rajya Parishad declined sharply once universal suffrage arrived 
with the Constitution and the first general elections of 1951-1952. 
The Hindu parties that proved more successful and resilient were 
the Jana Sangh and its successor, the BJP, both founded by the lay 
mass organization, the RSS.   
The formation of mass organizations occurred as argued by the 
Lipset-Rokkan theory, with democratization. In Germany, Catholic 
mass organizations began proliferating in the 1870s during the 
Kulturkampf years. The same phenomenon is observable with the 
progression of democracy in India. During the limited democracy 
under British rule and in the pre-Constitution years of independent 
India, the Hindu Mahasabha, a conservative group, sufficed to rep-
resent Hindu interests. The first Hindu mass organization, the RSS, 
was formed in 1925, exactly 2 years after the first direct elections 
for provincial and central councils. As democracy progressed in 
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both Germany and India, the electoral cooperation between ortho-
dox religious authorities and conservative parties proved less and 
less effective and the center of gravity in terms of political action 
and the forging of political identities transferred to lay Catholic 
and Hindu organizations, who distanced themselves from religious 
authorities.  
Construction of Political Ideology from Religious Influences 
The impetus to construct ideologies and identities transitioned 
as well to lay organizations and were shaped and reshaped in re-
sponse to structural changes. However, these evolving ideational 
constructs were built on the pre-existing socio-religious ideational 
foundations of Roman Catholicism and Hinduism and shaped by 
the pressures of competition from liberalism, socialism and capital-
ism.  
To be sure, the theological foundations of Roman Catholicism 
and Hinduism are absolutely distinct. Catholic thought begins with 
the Biblical principle of Original Sin, and regards human beings as 
“fallen” beings, with suffering being “the lot of humanity.”29. It is 
due to the fallen nature of humanity that the Pope argued for the 
“recognition of inequality as the normal and natural condition of 
society,” and only because of inequality can “society function 
properly.”30. Kersbergen explains that this religious view rational-
izes “the world as inhabited by men whose natural inequalities nec-
essarily beget social inequalities.”31. Thus, in the Catholic view, 
any political and social ideology that contends to eradicate suffer-
ing and inequality is leading the world towards “the fool’s para-
dise” and is doomed to failure.32. The most optimistic social 
doctrine is to make the unequal socioeconomic hierarchy function 
as cooperatively as possible in order to minimize suffering. The 
29.  Kersbergen, p. 223.
30.  Ibid.
31.  Ibid.
32.  Ibid. 
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corporatist vision of Hindu sociopolitical thought is influenced in 
part by the four-tier caste system established by the Vedas and the 
Manusmriti. In the Hindu conception, society is occupationally di-
vided between the Brahmins (priestly caste), the Kshatriyas (war-
rior and princely caste), the Vaishyas (trading and mercantile caste) 
and the Sudras (laboring and farming caste), creating a complex 
caste and class hierarchical organization. It is only when the 
peoples of the four castes work cooperatively, accepting their re-
spective stations and duties, that society functions harmoniously.  
In transmuting religious ideas into social and political ideas, 
there emerges a strong resonant structural similarity. Kersbergen’s 
following description of the Catholic social ethos echoes strongly 
the ideals of Hindu social doctrine: “All parts of the natural order 
of society have specific tasks that are necessary for the stability of 
the larger whole. According to the theory of ‘subsidiarity’ it is nev-
ertheless the state’s function to guarantee and facilitate the steady 
and orderly proficiency of the lower social organs up to a point 
where these components can operate independently of political ar-
bitration.”33. Both Christian Democracy and Hindu nationalism re-
gard society as an “organic” whole, constituted of distinct parts 
that are mutually dependent and contributive towards the health 
and well-being of the whole. This philosophical vision stands in 
stark contrast to the emphasis on the individual that liberalism 
creates and yields a completely distinctive social agenda. As Kees 
van Kersbergen observes, Christian democracy is ideationally 
structured to promote a “concept of social citizenship that departs 
significantly from the individualist… Christian democrats stress 
duties rather than rights, the family and the social group rather than 
the individual, society rather than the state, and distributional jus-
tice rather than social justice.34. In its attitude towards the state, 
Christian democracy “attempted to minimalize the state’s control 
33.  Kersbergen, p. 181.
34.  Kersbergen, p. 178.
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over the administration and execution of policies.”35. Similarly, 
Hindu ideologue and RSS leader Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar 
never prioritized the state, which was only one part of an organic 
whole. According to Golwalkar, “the ultimate vision of our work… 
is a perfectly organised state of society wherein each individual has 
been moulded into a model of ideal Hindu manhood and made into 
the living limb of the corporate personality of society.”36.  
In both Christian Democracy and Hindu nationalism, there may 
be different classes but instead of class warfare as envisioned by 
socialism or individualistic competition advocated by capitalism, 
cooperation and contribution is emphasized. Kersbergen notes 
“with a typical Catholic metaphor one could say that one cannot 
transfer part of the brain, which thinks, plans and directs, to the 
hands that do the work, whether via the markets or in the home.”37. 
Surprisingly, this Catholic metaphor resonates directly with a de-
fense of the Hindu caste system offered by a Hindu nationalist pol-
itician, Giriraj Kishore, in an interview given to Tariq Thachil: 
“The caste system… provided for job reservation. Every caste was 
given reservation in a particular job. A mason could not do a car-
penter’s job and a carpenter could not do a sweeper’s job.”38. The 
social thought of both religious systems regarded the best function-
ing social model to be organic and socio-economically compart-
mentalized into units with distinct functions and contributions 
towards the whole.  
Integral Humanism  
An important historical ideational intersection between Catho-
lic social thought and Hindu sociopolitical thought occurs in the 
development of the 1965 treatise Integral Humanism by Deendayal 
35.  Kersbergen, p. 176.
36.  Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts (Bangalore: Vikrama Prakashan, 1966), p. 88.
37.  Kersbergen, p. 189.
38.  Tariq Thachil, Elite Parties, Poor Voters: How Social Services Win Votes in India (New York, N.Y.: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2014).   
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Upadhyaya, an RSS veteran and leader of the Jana Sangh. The title 
itself was inspired by the 1936 work, Integral Humanism by 
French Catholic social philosopher, Jacques Maritain. In his work, 
Maritain critiques the development of totalitarian political systems 
as the inevitable product of the humanist and rationalist philoso-
phies and advocates for the “integration of spiritual and material 
concerns.”39. Maritain criticized both capitalism and communism 
for being unable to “facilitate the full actualization of an individ-
ual’s humanity.”40. Maritain’s thinking was part of the New Human-
ism literary movement that “sought to refocus the study of 
literature onto moral questions and the human will against the pre-
vailing literary methods that emphasized materialism and natural-
ism.”41. Maritain’s work deeply influenced the Indian communist 
intellectual M.N. Roy, who sought to emphasize the “autonomy of 
the individual under an alternative social order of decentralized 
local democracies,” which was a doctrine that in turn influenced 
Upadhyaya.42. Researcher John Abraham argues that Upadhyaya’s 
own proposals were a “selective synthesis” of Maritain and Roy’s 
works, which were reframed in the “conceptual vernacular of Ve-
danta” by drawing on a third stream of religious thought in the 
works of neo-Vedantist Aurobindo Ghosh.43.  
Hindu nationalist organizations describe Maritain as an ‘inter-
locutor’  and are reluctant to concede any direct impact of Mari-
tain’s thought on Upadhyaya.44. Indeed, Upadhyaya spends a 
considerable portion of his text criticizing the Christian conception 
of original sin as having debased humankind and made it more re-
liant on external mechanisms rather than the human spirit. Neither 
are the specific issues at the heart of Hindu social thought the same 
39.  John Abraham, “In Search of Dharma: Integral Humanism and the Political Economy of Hindu Na-
tionalism,” Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 42, Issue 1 (February 2019), pp. 18-19.
40.  Ibid.
41.  Abraham, p. 19-20.
42.  Ibid.
43.  Ibid. 
44.  Abraham, p. 18-19.
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as those that concern Catholic thought. However, both Maritain 
and Upadhyaya were engaged with the task of refuting the materi-
alist and humanist foundations of capitalism and communism, both 
of which posed a threat to the Christian Democratic and Hindu po-
litical movements.  There is no doubt then that Maritain’s work 
functioned to provide an exoskeleton to Upadhyaya’s own reinven-
tion of Hindu political thought. Both Maritain and Upadhyaya are 
agreed that the best sociopolitical doctrine shall regard society as 
an organic whole constructed by divinity and emphasize the impor-
tance of addressing spiritual as well as material needs. Upadhyaya 
makes the doctrine of “integration” the heart of his treatise, declar-
ing that “the first characteristic of Bharatiya [Indian] culture is that 
it looks upon life as an integrated whole. It has an integrated view-
point… We do admit there is diversity and plurality in life, but we 
have always attempted to discover the unity behind them.”45. Like 
Maritain, Upadhyaya goes on to denounce the divisive qualities of 
capitalism and communism as disrupting the organic whole: “We 
believe in neither capitalism nor communism, we believe in inte-
gral humanism. We believe in oneness and unity… People in the 
West give primary importance to demonic and destructive prac-
tices. They put self before everything else. On the contrary, we 
have accorded primary importance to selflessness and selfless good 
deeds.”46. According to researcher John Abraham, Upadhyaya situ-
ates his Integral Humanism in orientation within the “Vedantic tax-
onomy of human aspirations or purushartha: dharma (order), artha 
(wealth), kama (desire) and moksha (salvation). In setting out his 
system, Upadhyaya explicitly appealed to this framework, even al-
luding to the Vedic analogy between microcosm and macro-
cosm.”47. In a clear critique of rationalism and materialism, 
Upadhyaya argues that Hindus are “a God-centric people. That 
which is not visible is the center of our gaze... Moving towards it, 
45.  Deen Dayal Upadhyaya, Integral Humanism (New Delhi: Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 1965), p. 18-39.
46.  Ibid. 
47.  Abraham, p. 19-20.
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we get ever closer to the center… That’s why we believe that soul 
resides in all.”48. Contrast Upadhyaya’s approach with Maritain’s 
desire to facilitate the “rehabilitation of the creature in God, which 
I see as characterizing a new age of Christendom and a new hu-
manism.”49. Where Upadhyaya seeks to “re-center” society’s orien-
tation towards God, Maritain aims to “return” society’s orientation 
into God. However, both ideations articulate both the fountainhead 
and objective of social endeavors to be God.  
While substantially varied in their specific proposals, this inter-
section between Catholic social philosophy and Hindu philosophy 
is revealing of the innovations and fusions made possible due to 
the competitive ideational pressures of communism, liberalism and 
capitalism. Neither the Christian Democratic movement nor the 
Hindu movement could resort to tactical piecemeal innovations to 
counter political challenges. They were compelled to construct 
comprehensive ideational alternatives to propel their respective 
movements. 
Endurance 
The endurance of the religious and moral framework of both 
Christian Democracy in Germany and Hindu nationalism in India 
can be explained by understanding that both nation-states under-
went similar historical moments in their experiences of industrial-
ization and modernization. Kees van Kersbergen points out that 
“up until the 1860s the Industrial Revolution in Germany was oc-
curring at a rather slow pace. The social question was hardly a 
problem of proletarianized industrial workers. It was rather a rural 
problem.”50. The first decade of unified Germany was marked with 
accelerating industrialization but also the arrival of the Kultur-
kampf, which forced Catholic politicians and ideologues into a “de-
48.  Upadhyaya, p. 18-39. 
49.  Jacques Maritain, Integral Humanism: Temporal and Spiritual Problems of a New Christendom, 
translated by Joseph W. Evans (New York, N.Y.: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968), p. 76.
50.  Kersbergen, p. 214-215. 
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fensive position” that “did not permit straightforward substantial 
alterations of the basic doctrines, however, outworn the old dogma 
might have been;” instead, social doctrine became an essential 
weapon to fight the Kulturkampf measures.51. At independence, 
India experienced a similar historical moment, in that industrializa-
tion had been very slow and the country remained a predominantly 
rural society. Indeed, Upadhyaya’s advocacy of “democratic de-
centralization” in Integral Humanism harkens to the rural ethos of 
empowering “village democracy.” To accelerate India’s industrial-
ization in the 1950s, Prime Minister Nehru relied upon “a large 
measure of socialism – not doctrinaire socialism but practical, 
pragmatic socialism” while simultaneously pursuing what we have 
described as an Indian Kulturkampf in his efforts to reform Hindu 
laws.52. As a result, the traditionalist Hindu social doctrines con-
tinued to resonate politically for many decades after India’s inde-
pendence, and these doctrines were politically weaponized by the 
resistance to the Hindu reform legislation.  
Comparative Political Economy  
The design of the political economies created by Christian 
Democratic movement in Germany and the Hindu nationalist 
movement in India reflects their core ideational priorities: the pres-
ervation of socioeconomic stratification based on religious concep-
tions of society and the pursuit of distributive justice, rather than 
social justice through redistribution.  
The construction of a viable welfare state was an early political 
priority in both Germany and India. In The Three Worlds of Wel-
fare Capitalism, Gøsta Esping-Andersen identifies the emergence 
of conservative political economy in the “reaction to the French 
Revolution and the Paris Commune. It was avowedly nationalistic 
and anti-revolutionary, and sought to arrest the democratic im-
51.  Kersbergen, p. 214-215. 
52.  Kumar, p. 337.
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pulse.”53. In India, the construction of a welfare state was priori-
tized in the Constitution, whose Article 38 “defined the aim as fol-
lows: ‘The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people 
by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in 
which justice, social, economic and political shall inform all the in-
stitutions of the national life.”54. The authors of India’s constitution 
“were very clear in their minds that without social and economic 
democracy, political democracy had no meaning in a poor country 
like India.”55. This was a sentiment echoed in Germany in the late 
19th century, where “the development of social rights… [was] 
mainly understood as the consequence of trying to make rights ac-
tually work, i.e. of removing the barriers that block the full and 
equal exercise of civil and political rights.”56.  
However, the advent of unbridled capitalism and industrializa-
tion “tended to reduce the social meaning of these rights to mere 
formal capacities, a contradiction that created the foundations of 
and necessity for social policy.”57. The championing of individual 
freedom and rights under the capitalist economic system was 
weakening social rights and duties, and thus, conservative and reli-
gious political forces felt compelled to develop an ideational alter-
native. Esping-Andersen points out that the welfare state is not just 
a “mechanism that intervenes in, and possibly corrects, the struc-
ture of inequality; it is, in its own right, a system of stratifica-
tion.”58. In Germany, the Bismarck regime implemented a 
“social-insurance” welfare-state model that was designed to “con-
solidate divisions among wage-earners by legislating distinct pro-
grams for different class and status groups, each with its own 
conspicuously unique set of rights and privileges which was de-
53.  Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press. 1990), p. 10.
54.  Kumar, p. 339-340.
55.  Ibid., p. 338-339.
56.  Kersbergen, p. 179.
57.  Ibid.
58.  Esping-Andersen, p. 23.
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signed to accentuate the individual’s appropriate station in life.”59. 
The second objective of the Bismarck system, however, was “to tie 
the loyalties of the individual directly to the monarchy or the cen-
tral state authority,” which varied considerably from the Catholic 
social vision.60. The Christian Democratic movement modified the 
German welfare-state to neutralize the second objective, replacing 
the emphasis on individual-state relations with an emphasis on the 
“preservation of traditional family-hood” and innovating the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, which “serves to emphasize that the state will 
only interfere when the family’s capacity to service its members is 
exhausted.”61. This Christian Democratic-corporatist welfare state 
model represents the principle of “distributive justice,” which “ac-
cords to each and every class what is its due” and resists the social-
democratic notion of redistribution of wealth to combat 
socioeconomic inequality.62. In the Christian Democratic view, the 
purpose of  “social policy is not to alter status, but to reproduce 
it.”63. 
One could be forgiven for mistaking Kersbergen’s description 
of the Christian Democratic social ethic that “members of a class 
and of vocational groups, therefore, have a right to be treated in ac-
cordance with their status” as a description of a Hindu corporatist 
distributive policy.64. It certainly would serve to describe the strati-
fying effects of the BJP government’s welfare policies that have 
been steadily implemented since 2014. Under Prime Minister Na-
rendra Modi, the BJP won decisive majorities in both the 2014 and 
2019 general elections, and as a result, made no ideational compro-
mises with non-ideological political partners in its policy creation 
and implementation. Thus, it would be fair to identify the welfare-
state policies of the Modi government as a uniquely “Hindu Demo-
59.  Esping-Anderson, p. 24.
60.  Ibid. 
61.  Ibid., p. 27.
62.  Kersbergen, p. 189.
63.  Ibid. 
64.  Ibid. 
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cratic political economy.” Several welfare schemes implemented 
by the Modi government have exemplified the principle of the state 
intervening only “when the family’s capacity is exhausted.”65. 
These include the Ujjwala scheme of providing poor families with 
free natural gas cylinders, ending their traditional reliance upon 
burning firewood and charcoal to cook meals.66. As India experi-
ences the rise of one of the largest middle-classes in the world, this 
specific intervention is certainly timed to provide relief to families 
that remained at the end of the socio-economic ladder. The Ujjwala 
scheme was particularly directed at women, appealing to, and rein-
forcing their traditional role as homemakers, and as a result, won 
the BJP more political support from women in the 2019 election.67. 
A major policy of the Modi government was the Ayushman Bharat 
(Blessed India) health-care program, which was promoted as 
India’s first step towards a universal health-care system. However, 
in practice, this program is actually a means-tested health-care pro-
gram that makes available private insurance to the poorest Indians 
by offering a government-funded annual cover of INR 500,000 for 
household medical expenses.68. The beneficiaries of this scheme 
are automatically identified and enrolled through the socioeco-
nomic and caste census, which ensures that the poorest and the 
most disadvantaged caste groups are benefitted.69. As a result, class 
and caste metrics serve as important determinants of benefits 
within the political economy.   
A most poignant case of the Modi government’s shift towards 
“distributive justice” rather than “social justice” comes from its re-
form of India’s affirmative action policy of providing reserved 
65.  Ibid.
66.  Vibha Atri and Anurag Jain, “Post-poll survey: when schemes translate into votes,” The Hindu, May 
27, 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/elections/lok-sabha-2019/when-schemes-translate-into-votes/ar-
ticle27256139.ece.
67.  Ibid. 
68.  H. Bakshi, R. Sharma, and P. Kumar, “Ayushman Bharat Initiative (2018): What We Stand to Gain or 
Lose” Indian Journal of Community Medicine, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp 63–66.
69.  Ibid. 
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quotas in public sector employment and educational institutions to 
the most disadvantaged and backward caste communities. This “re-
servation” policy was originally incorporated into India’s Constitu-
tion as an intervention to rectify the historic discrimination and 
exclusion experienced by the lowest Hindu castes. However, the 
RSS strongly criticized the reservation policy, arguing that “if 
castes have a vested interest in their caste identity because of the 
benefits to them from reservation,” they will work to preserve divi-
sions and obstruct the “harmonious collaboration of all limbs of so-
ciety,” which was the objective of Hindu nationalist social 
thought.70. Although the reservations policy bred discontent 
amongst upper-castes for decades, the Jana Sangh and later the BJP 
were reluctant to argue for their abolition as such a policy would 
be interpreted as antagonistic to lower castes. However, the issue 
came to a head when on August 7th, 1990, Prime Minister Vishwa-
nath Pratap Singh of the Janata Dal socialist alliance announced 
that it would implement the recommendations of the Mandal Com-
mission, “which meant that 27 percent of central administration 
posts would be reserved for Other Backward Classes (OBCs, the 
list of which was in fact a list of low castes).”71. The RSS publica-
tion Organiser attacked this positive discrimination policy from 
“an organicist angle: ‘The havoc the politics of reservation is play-
ing with the social fabric is unimaginable. It provides a premium 
for mediocrity, encourages brain-drain and sharpens caste-
divide.”72. This new extension of the reservation policy has been 
deeply criticized by upper caste Hindus for excluding them from 
employment and educational opportunities. This progressive policy 
was regarded as “punitive” towards upper-caste communities and 
assisted the BJP’s rise to power through the 1990s.  
To rectify the perceived error of this policy, the BJP manifesto 
70.  Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism: A Reader, p. 256.
71.  Ibid. 
72.  Ibid. 
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“announced a 10 per cent reservation on the basis of economic crit-
eria to all economically weaker sections of society, apart from 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and OBCs.”73. This policy in-
novation established the distributive justice heart of Hindu political 
economy. As journalist Snigdha Poonam’s interview of an upper-
caste Hindu youth reveals a deep and ingrained resentment of so-
cial-democratic parties like the Congress, which “was the 
embodiment of everything that was holding back a country on the 
brink of awesomeness.”74. The social-democratic model of provid-
ing “subsidies to the poor… employment and education ‘quotas’ 
for the backward castes” was described as a “politics of coward-
ice” by the upper-caste respondent.75. Most poignantly, Poonam’s 
interviewee “often brought up a feudal estate in Uttar Pradesh his 
grandparents had had to give up as part of the newly independent 
India’s socialist move to redistribute land.”76. This reflects the tra-
ditional resentment that upper-caste Hindus have harbored for the 
egalitarian ideals that drove the Congress’s social-democratic wel-
fare policies, and which moved them steadily into the column of 
the Jana Sangh and later the BJP. Incorporating this restorative im-
pulse into a program of distributive justice, the Modi government 
amended the Indian Constitution in January 2019 to provide a 10% 
reservation in public sector employment and educational institu-
tions for those experiencing “economic backwardness,” which was 
immediately translated into providing reservations for upper-caste 
Hindus experiencing economic disadvantages.77. The policy proved 
immensely popular with India’s upper-castes that had long resented 
egalitarianism-driven interventionism on behalf of lower caste 
73.  Ibid, p. 257.
74.  Snigdha Poonam, Dreamers: How Young Indians Are Changing Their World (Gurgaon: Penguin Ran-
dom House India, 2018), p. 118-119.
75.  Ibid.
76.  Ibid. 
77.  Staff Report, “Bill on 10% reservation for upper caste poor passes Parliament test: 10 things to 
know,” Business Today, January 10, 2019, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/bill-on-
10pc-reservation-for-upper-caste-poor-passes-parliament-test-10-things-to-know/story/308641.html. Ac-
cessed on 12-16-2019.
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Hindus and religious minorities. As a result, even opposition politi-
cal parties such as the Congress voted for Modi’s amendment.   
The BJP’s strategy is rooted in Upadhyaya’s Integral Human-
ism, which “does not seek to create rifts and schisms between var-
ious sections of society but aims at removing social and economic 
disparities that have resulted in denial of a share in power, impov-
erishment and erosion of human dignity.”78. Thus, the service-based 
and caste-accommodative strategies serve to induct backward caste 
communities into the Hindu Whole, strengthening them to contrib-
ute towards the greater good of society. The BJP’s strategic serv-
ice-and-caste-based innovations were taking place at an important 
ideational and structure juncture in Indian history. In the early 
1990s, the Congress-led Indian government had adopted pro-mar-
ket economic liberalization policies in order to revive a stagnant 
national economy. This was a significant departure from the post-
independence socialist consensus that had guided India’s socioeco-
nomic policies for more than forty years. The historian Bipan 
Chandra records that in the 1990s, the “inspiration and ideological-
political structuring provided by the national liberation struggle are 
increasingly receding,” with the Congress Party being left ideolog-
ically “directionless and in shambles” and other “secular opposi-
tion parties and groups unable to cohere.”79. In this moment in 
India’s ideational history, the Left was “dissipated and bereft of 
any fresh ideas.”80. This new-found respectability of the BJP was 
based not, however, on simply its “communal” message, but be-
cause it was rapidly constructing the ideational socioeconomic al-
ternative to the now exhausted socialist consensus. The BJP’s 
Hindu political economy was emerging to serve a transformed 
India that was rapidly urbanizing and industrializing, with a new 
middle-class emerging but still retaining the sociocultural values of 
78.  Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism: A Reader, p. 263-264.
79.  Bipan Chandra, Essays on Contemporary India (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1993), p. 49. 
80.  Ibid. 
147 •  Summer 2021 | Issue 2 | Volume I UR
A Comparative Study of European Christian Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in India
rural India. The Hindu nationalist ideational model emerged as a 
competitive alternative amidst the ideational exhaustion and ero-
sion of the socialist consensus, driving the BJP’s political expan-
sion across Indian states and finally into power in the central 
government as the first non-Congress political party to win consec-
utive majorities. 
The 2019 general election in India can be described as having 
pivoted on the argument between the Hindu-corporatist welfare 
state model developed by the BJP and the social-democratic alter-
native promoted by the Congress. During the campaign, the Con-
gress announced declared that if voted into power, it would 
implement the “NYAY” policy, under which low-income house-
holds would receive an annual stipend of INR 72,000 from the cen-
tral government, benefiting an estimated 250 million people.81. 
This policy was hailed as one of the first practical proposals em-
bodying the universal basic income concept, albeit it was reserved 
for the poor. In contrast, the Modi-led BJP ran on its implementa-
tion of the Ujjwala and Ayushman Bharat schemes. The outcome 
was a resounding and larger parliamentary majority for the BJP. 
Speaking after the election defeat, Congress leader Shashi Tharoor 
stated that Congress’s message about the NYAY scheme had been 
decisively opposed by voters in “urban areas and among profes-
sional classes, who would be paying for the scheme, rather than the 
bottom 20 percent, mainly in rural India, who would become bene-
ficiaries.”82. Post-poll surveys demonstrated that welfare schemes 
such as Ujjwala had helped the BJP increased their vote tally from 
women from 29% in 2014 to 36% in 2019, at the expense of the 
Congress.83. This election verdict reinforced the effectiveness of 
81.  Divyanshu Dutta Roy, ed., “Congress’s Minimum Income Guarantee Scheme “NYAY” Explained in 10 
Points,” NDTV India, March 26, 2019, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/congress-nyay-nyuntam-aay-yo-
jana-scheme-minimum-income-guarantee-proposal-explained-2012735.
82.  Press Trust of India, “BJP marketed ‘product Modi’ well, built ‘extraordinary personality cult’: Shashi 
Tharoor,” Economic Times, May 29, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-na-
tion/bjp-marketed-product-modi-well-built-extraordinary-personality-cult-shashi-
tharoor/articleshow/69556582.cms.
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the Hindu welfare model, which prioritized traditional gender roles 
in both service delivery and political messaging, in contrast to the 
more universalistic appeal of the Congress’s NYAY scheme.  
 
Conclusion – from Hindu Nationalism to Hindu Democracy 
The symmetries between the Christian Democratic movement 
in Germany and the Hindu nationalist movement in India demon-
strate that structural cleavages that produced rival ideational move-
ments can in turn influence the creation of similar structural 
cleavages when those ideational products enter a new political sys-
tem at a formative historical juncture. The original crisis of the 
French Revolution may reproduce itself in countries across ethnic, 
cultural, economic, and religious boundaries. Secondly, while ide-
ational systems shall be adapted to the specificities and cultural nu-
ances of national political systems and to the characteristics of the 
historical period in question, their ideational and political super-
structure may be more symmetrical. Although German Christian 
democracy varies considerably in specific policies and issues from 
Hindu nationalism, their interactions, organizations and political 
and policy outcomes shall bear a superstructural symmetry. 
Thirdly, it is observable that the rational choice and action theory 
experiences two specific constraints – one being structural and the 
other being ideational.  
These conclusions have a direct impact on the study of the 
Hindu nationalist movement in India. Firstly, it will be recognized 
that Hindu politics has expanded beyond “Hindu nationalism” and 
towards constructing a “Hindu Democracy” in India. Contempo-
rary Hindu politics are not limited in pursuing the construction of a 
Hindu national solidarity but seek to respond to the assertive lib-
eral-secularist constitutional regime as well as to the challenges of 
83.  The Hindu. 
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industrialization, globalization, and economic liberalization. Hindu 
nationalist politics aspire to create not only a competitive constitu-
tional reinterpretation of India as a Hindu majoritarian state but are 
overseeing the development of a Hindu political economy as a 
competitive response to Indian social democratic political econ-
omy. However, it must be noted that while Christian Democracy 
has largely secularized and democratized in nature, the devel-
opment of Hindu nationalism remains significantly affected by re-
ligious extremism, jingoism, and authoritarianism. These factors 
may ultimately deny a potential secularization of Hindu politics 
and lead the Hindu nationalist movement towards a different future 
than contemporary Christian Democracy.   
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